THE PORTUGUESE IN MALAYA

by

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It is a commonplace of Malayan history that the first Portuguese to reach Malacca came on the five ships of Diogo Lopes de Sequeira in September 1509. The dark suspicions of Professor Hall and Dr. Purcell that the fleet was sent to attack Malacca, or at least to provoke sultan Mahmud to hostilities, seem unfounded. The instructions of king D. Manuel to Sequeira emphasized the need to promote mutual trust at Malacca as a preliminary to profitable and reciprocal trade and there is no reason to suppose that this injunction was modified by the viceroy, Almeida, during Sequeira's brief stay at Cochin on the outward voyage. Two further pieces of evidence can be cited to illustrate Sequeira's pacific intentions: the fact that he was not required to sail to Malacca at all if he could pick up a suitable cargo for Lisbon in Madagascar; and D. Manuel's action in sending the fleet of Diogo Mendes de Vasconcellos on a peaceful trading voyage to Malacca in March 1510. At that time neither the king, nor the new governor of India, Afonso de Albuquerque, were aware of the bloody outcome of Sequeira's visit to Malacca and it was only after Diogo Mendes met Albuquerque off the Malabar coast in August 1510 that plans were made for a punitive expedition against sultan Mahmud. Finally, the story of the Malay-Gujerati plot against Sequeira's men, although derived entirely from Portuguese sources, is sufficiently circumstantial to show that the Portuguese, far from making plans to seize Malacca in 1509, were engaged in the prosaic task of collecting cargo for the homeward voyage when they were slaughtered in the streets of the town.

It is generally accepted that the arch-schemer of the plot against Sequeira was the Bendahara Sri Maharaja, instigated by the large merchant community from Gujerat which frequented Malacca. It was also an article of faith with the Portuguese historians of the sixteenth century that Sultan Mahmud was aware of the intended treachery, that he held a council on the matter in which the laksamana and the temenggong were vehemently opposed to any assault on the Portuguese, but that he was finally swayed by his Bendahara to order the massacre of the men of Sequeira. The Portuguese historians attributed the massacre to Mahmud, but the good sense of the Malacca residents led to a conciliatory approach which restored trade to former levels within a few years of the event. The eventual invasion of Malacca by the Portuguese, which led to the formation of the State of Segundo, did not occur until 1511 after the death of Mahmud and the ascension to power of his son, Ahmad. The story of the plot against Sequeira is largely derived from Portuguese sources and there is no evidence that the Portuguese were planning to attack Malacca in 1509.

1. When Sequeira left Lisbon in April 1508 he had four ships and his subordinate commanders were Jeronimo Teixeira, Diogo Martins and Goncalo de Sousa. At Cochin Almeida added a fifth ship under Garcia de Sousa.
5. The details of the attack on Sequeira are taken from the translations of Barros, Correa, Damião de Goes and D. Jeronimo Osorio in the Macgregor Papers in the University of Singapore. I am indebted to Professor K. G. Tregonning and the University Librarian for granting me access to the Papers. It is interesting to note that the Sejarah Melayu makes no reference to the attack on Sequeira.
The central contention which this paper has been discussing should by now have emerged with some clarity. It is the old conflict between science and art, between the nomothetic and the idiographic, between Verkennen and Verstehen, between the rational and the intuitive. But this quarrel is not simply confined to historical explanation, though it is here that the issues have been fought over with the greatest ferocity and the most highly-evolved weapons and strategy. This, I suggest, is because it has been very largely a battle disputing a small, clearly-defined and heavily-defended area. (Much the same conditions, one may add cynically, prevailed on the Western front during the 1914-18 war where the results were much the same — great slaughter but very little progress!) Yet a similar battle, fought with less skill and precision but with as much ferocity, has been raging in Western culture for several decades. The recent interchange of asperities between Sir Charles Snow and Dr. Leavis bears witness to this. The reader will remember that Snow, who has been the outstanding advocate of the claims of science against the humanities, was incautious enough to put his protests into a literary form by enshrining them in novels. For this he came under the withering fire of Leavis who accused him of having his novels written "by a computing machine called Charlie" and went on to attack the whole concept of scientific culture which Snow has been advocating. I mention this only to show that the battle whose tactics and strategy I have been outlining is merely one episode in what may well turn out to be the major issue of this century. As Eugene Wigner has pointed out, we are at present living in a heroic age of science in which the ideals of the scientist are rapidly assuming pre-eminence over all earlier ideals. But as Wigner demonstrates, science is already approaching its confines and scientists are beginning to realize that we are unable to arrive at a full understanding of the inanimate world however hard we try, since we are checked by the basic limits of the human intellect. The ideals of science themselves may vanish just as those say, of Confucian civilization have done. We must beware of assuming that historical understanding has to be chained to the triumphal chariot of science simply because science is master for the moment. It may even be that future advances in science may cut away the ground from some of the most cherished tenets on which science rests at the moment and institute a return to methods approximating to those of the artist. History may yet turn out to be closer to literature than to science and be all the truer for being so. Art, whom Collingwood left sitting in the kitchen, may yet be queen of the Muses and History prove to be of her kingdom. But this, of course, is but the wildest speculation. In the light of the arguments I have outlined above, and these represent only a crude and inadequate summary of the arguments advanced by the participants in this controversy, it looks very much as though, in the historical field at least, science is still maintaining its position. Dr. Johnson once declared that history was "the easiest of the arts". It now looks very much as though, to quote Fustel de Coulanges and Burekhardt, it is "the most difficult of the sciences".

opposed to the scheme, and that he was finally induced to support it by the bribes of the Gujerati merchants and their not unwarranted tales of Portuguese aggression elsewhere. Mahmud protested his ignorance of the plot to Sequeira immediately before the departure of the latter from Malacca, and again to Albuquerque when he appeared with the Portuguese punitive expedition in 1511. Contemporary Portuguese would have agreed with Albuquerque's son when he dismissed Mahmud's protestations as "full of deceit and specious words and falsehoods"., but a modern historian cannot accuse Mahmud of duplicity with such easy abandon. It must be admitted that the weight of the evidence lies heavily against the sultan, but there is the bare possibility that he was unaware of the plans of the bendahara.

The complete surprise achieved by the plotters shows that Sequeira and his men had no information on the preliminary stages of the plot at that time. The belief that the Sultan was implicated gained ground only after Ruy d'Araujo denounced him in the letters which he smuggled to Albuquerque from his captivity in Malacca. Araujo seems to have been particularly anxious to place even the most humane of Mahmud's actions in the worst possible light and the reliability of the sultan's accusers is questionable because they may have wished to reinsure themselves against an eventual Portuguese conquest of Malacca. An obvious method of curry ing favour with the Portuguese was to confirm them in their suspicions of Mahmud. Even after the capture of Malacca in 1511, the Portuguese seem to have possessed nothing more concrete as evidence against Mahmud than local rumour. Tomé Pires, in recounting the council which Mahmud is supposed to have held with the bendahara, temenggong and laksamana, preludes his story with the words "They say that............". If the discussions in the council were such common knowledge to the citizens of Malacca in 1509 (and it must be remembered that Pires's informants would have been non-Moslems, because the Malays and Gujeratis fled from the town), it is remarkable that not a hint of the plan reached Sequeira. After the Portuguese captured Malacca, however, the most secret details of a well-executed plot were remembered, apparently, by many of the inhabitants.

Mahmud claimed that he was absent on a visit to his country estate when Sequeira's men were attacked and that the outburst of anti-Portuguese resentment surprised him as much as it did Sequeira. Even the bendahara assured Araujo later that "the tumult which had arisen against the Portuguese had not been brought about by his design nor his orders, but that the Guzerates and Jaos [Javanese] had planned it withDut his knowledge, because they were afraid that the Portuguese would treat them badly whenever they went out of their port". One cannot place too much reliance on the words of the bendahara because he had then maltreated his Portuguese prisoners for over a year, and he declared his ignorance of the plot only after the Portuguese conquest of Goa in November 1510 had given ample proof of Portuguese military potential. But Mahmud made his denial of complicity to Sequeira shortly after the attack, when there was no fear of Portuguese retribution. The sultan even offered to hand over

10. Birch, Commentaries, III, 44. This fear was not unjustified, because the Portuguese had attacked Gujerat ships mercilessly in the Arabian Sea since the Moslem riot against Cabral's men in Calicut in December 1500.
the Portuguese survivors on shore, but Sequeira, not unnaturally, declined to trust his ships in Malacca anchorage again. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the bendahara, not the sultan, was responsible apparently for the ill-treatment of Araujo and his compatriots, who remained in the hands of the bendahara until they were transferred to better quarters after the conquest of Goa.

It is possible, therefore, that the Bendahara Sri Maharaja and the shabandar of the Gujerat community arranged the attack on Sequeira between them, without consulting Mahmud. The *Séjarah Melayu* described the Bendahara Sri Maharaja as “the grandest of all the Bendaharas. If he was seated in his public hall with people before him and a prince appeared, he would not leave his seat but would merely hold out his hand and invite the prince to come up into the hall. It was only for an heir-apparent to the throne that he would leave his seat, though if the Raja of Pahang appeared, Bendahara Sri Maharaja would stand up............”. Even more significant, the Bendahara was the local political figure best known and respected by the foreign merchant communities, so that the prayer in ships sailing to Malacca was “May we reach Malaka safely and see Pisang Jeram, the stream of Bukit China and Bendahara Sri Maharaja!” Tomé Pires ascribed the execution of the bendahara by Mahmud shortly before Albuquerque’s invasion to the sultan’s uneasiness “lest the Bendara should rise up with the kingdom, because the king was unknown compared with the Bendara”. Even in the *Séjarah Melayu* sultan Mahmud remains a pleasure-loving nonentity, who fails to take any positive political action of his own until he has the Bendahara Sri Maharaja executed early in 1511. By way of comparison, after the flight of Mahmud to Bintang, it is the laksamana and not the sultan whom the Portuguese describe as the enterprising and courageous leader behind Malay counterattacks in the 1520’s.

11. Here one comes to a problem of interpretation of motive. The Portuguese would argue that the sultan and bendahara spared the lives of Araujo and the eighteen other Portuguese to use them as a bargaining point at a future date; similarly, the offer to deliver up the Portuguese survivors was a subterfuge to lure Sequeira’s ships into another trap. But why should one adhere rigidly to the contemporary Portuguese version by ascribing the worst possible motives to Mahmud? It does not seem likely that the Malays spared Araujo and his fellow prisoners as a security against future retribution. One of the justifications for the attack on Sequeira was the argument that the Portuguese would not visit Malacca again if a disaster overtook the first fleet sent there. Even the bendahara does not seem to have feared a Portuguese punitive expedition until after the conquest of Goa by Albuquerque in November 1510. Also, in anti-Portuguese outbreaks of this kind, it was unusual for the lives of the Portuguese on shore to be spared; there were no survivors of this type at Calicut in December 1500. It should be remembered that the Portuguese regarded the outbreak at Calicut as a plot, although it was more probably an unpredmeditated wave of resentment, which the Hindu zamorin of Calicut was unable to control. Is it possible that Mahmud, finding himself in a similar position, was able to prevent the killing of Araujo and the survivors? One would not expect the Portuguese colonial government to give Mahmud credit for his action, any more than it responded to the zamorin’s repeated efforts to make peace between 1500 and 1513.

We cannot expect to learn much about the political balance in Malacca in 1509, but if Mahmud had become a mere figurehead, the bendahara may have organised the attack on Sequeira on the assumption that the sultan would be supine enough to condone his action. Mahmud later placed the blame for the attack on the bendahara and claimed that he had executed him for that very reason. From his captivity, Araujo was at pains to explain to Albuquerque that the real reason for the execution of the bendahara was his attempt to seize the throne. But Araujo’s explanation does not exclude the explanation of Mahmud. Instead, the two reasons may be complementary.

If Mahmud was overshadowed by the bendahara in 1509 and 1510, he would not be in a position to reverse the anti-Portuguese policy of the bendahara until the minister also changed his attitude or was removed from power. All this is pure conjecture. The most simple, and hence most probable, explanation is that sultan Mahmud was implicated in the plot and lied consistently to the Portuguese. But it is sometimes interesting to postulate an alternative explanation.

The Portuguese accounts of the various attempts made to murder Sequeira and his men are not without inconsistencies. Apparently, the first plan of the Bendahara was to kill Sequeira at a banquet on a raised platform near the beach, but he was foiled by the timely warning given to Sequeira by a Javanese, or Persian, lady who kept one of the local taverns. The captains of the Chinese junks at Malacca were also reported to have been prolific in their hints of Malay treachery. If Sequeira received such early intimations of a plot, it is remarkable that he should have been so lax in his subsequent precautions. Yet he later allowed eight or nine armed Malays and Javanese to gather around him in his cabin, while he sat, weaponless, playing chess.

This brings us to the second plan of the bendahara. A large number of Sequeira’s men were to be lured to scattered points in the city on the pretext that quantities of spices awaited their collection, while parties of Malays and Javanese, disguised as vendors of provisions, gathered around the undermanned Portuguese ships. One group of plotters, led according to most accounts by the son of Utimutaraja, the leading Javanese merchant of Malacca, was assigned the task of murdering Sequeira in his cabin on the flagship. The outcry caused by the slaughter of the Portuguese on shore was to be the signal to stab Sequeira. As a final guarantee of success, the Malay luncharas concealed behind Cape Rachado were to sweep down on the Portuguese ships and overpower them.

The plot worked remarkably well in its initial stages. Sequeira was induced to invite the son of Utimutaraja and several Malays to his cabin to watch a game of chess in which they professed interest. Ruy d’Araujo, the factor, and some thirty Portuguese made their way into the town to “collect cloves”. Other Portuguese seamen remained with the ships’ boats on the beach or busied themselves boiling tar on Ilha de Naos (Pulo Java). The Malay “provision vendors” gathered around the Portuguese ships. It was this last development which aroused the suspicions of captain Garcia de Sousa, who kept the Malay perahu at a respectable distance from his ship and sent Fernao Magelhaes to advise Sequeira and the other captains.

15. Commentaries, III, p.66.
16. Better known to English readers as Ferdinand Magellan, who later transferred to Spanish service and commanded the first Spanish trans-Pacific expedition to the Spice Islands in 1519—21. Also with Sequeira’s fleet was Francisco Serrao, a friend of Magelhaes, and the first Portuguese to reach the Moluccas, where he died in 1521.
of his misgivings. Meanwhile, in Sequeira's cabin, Utimutaraja's son fingered his kris uneasily while he waited, presumably, for the signal from the shore. He was seen through the skylight by the lookout on the quarterdeck, who, already disturbed by the Moslems running towards the beach, raised the cry of "Treason!". Sequeira shouted for his weapons and the would-be assassins leaped overboard, although it is difficult to explain their failure to cut down the defenceless Sequeira before their flight. Thanks to Garcia de Sousa's watchfulness and his despatch of Magelhaes around the fleet, the "provision vendors" failed to board the Portuguese ships. The ships cut their cables in time to meet the onslaught of the Malay lancharas approaching them from the sea and handled their cannons so effectively that the lancharas were glad to take shelter under the artillery along the Malacca waterfront.

The Portuguese on shore were less fortunate. Francisco Serrao and three or four other men were picked up by a boat from one of the ships, but the rest, including the ten seamen on Ilha de Naos, were killed or taken prisoner. Sequeira estimated his losses at sixty men, among whom were the chief pilot and Ruy d'Araujo. Serrao reported that Araujo and the men in the Portuguese factory had defended themselves bravely and it was believed that about thirty Portuguese remained alive as prisoners. This fact, and the danger of losing the monsoon to India, restrained Sequeira from attempting to take revenge at Malacca, although he sank a few Malay and Javanese vessels in Malacca Strait and captured three Moslem ships off Travancore. Sequeira's parting message to Mahmud was a warning to protect Araujo and the other survivors unless he wished to see his city destroyed by the Portuguese.

It was left to two of Sequeira's captains to convey the news of the disaster to Albuquerque, who had succeeded to the governorship of India in November 1509. Sequeira, who was a supporter of the previous viceroy, Almeida, sailed direct to Lisbon. Albuquerque in turn advised Diogo Mendes de Vasconcellos of the setback when the latter reached western India from Portugal in August(?) 1510. Diogo Mendes was induced to delay his punitive expedition against Malacca in order to assist in Albuquerque's second and successful attack on Goa in November 1510. When Albuquerque sought to requisition his ships yet again for the proposed Red Sea expedition in February 1511, Diogo Mendes indignantly led his ships out of Cochin with the intention of sailing against Malacca independently, but Albuquerque sent galleys in pursuit and compelled him to return. Diogo Mendes and his three captains were deprived of their commands and

17. This point is puzzling. Having taken such pains to get aboard, it is incredible that the presumed assassins failed to complete the task for which they had come. To stab Sequeira would have delayed their flight by only a few seconds. Is it unreasonable to speculate that they were not would-be assassins, but were paying a genuine and coincidental courtesy visit to the ship? In that case, one would have to assume that the Portuguese lookout misinterpreted the action of Utimutaraja's son in handling his kris. By that time the Moslems on shore could be seen running to attack the Portuguese on the beach and it was natural for the lookout to shout "Treason!". It would be equally natural for Sequeira's guests to panic even if they were innocent, when Sequeira called for his weapons. Finally, the identification of the chief assassin as Utimutaraja's son is odd, because Utimutaraja was the first important Javanese to place himself under Albuquerque's protection during the 1511 invasion.
were sent under arrest to Portugal; the two pilots who had helped Mendes to navigate his ships out of Cochin harbour were hanged. Having brought Diogo Mendes’s ships under his control, Albuquerque set sail for the Red Sea, but his inability to round the Padua shoal caused him to divert the armada to Malacca.

Some weeks after the capture of Goa, but before he set out for the Red Sea in February 1511, Albuquerque received a letter from Araujo. It is difficult to exaggerate the significance of Araujo’s reports from Malacca in determining Albuquerque’s attitude to the peace overtures of the Malay government. Every action of the bendahara or sultan Mahmud which might have been interpreted in a favourable light by Albuquerque was derided by Araujo as a subterfuge. Araujo admitted that after an initial period of hardship, during which the bendahara tried to convert the Portuguese prisoners forcibly to Islam, he “thought good to give them a home in which they were all living, and ten thousand catains of merchandise, whereof they were to support themselves by the profits, declaring that he was ready, on his part, to make good to them all the loss they had received when Afonso Dalboquerque, on his part, should reimburse him for the loss............. which he had experienced from the attacks made by Portuguese ships on his junks". Araujo ascribed this change of heart entirely to fear of retribution by Albuquerque and it is difficult to explain the bendahara’s conduct in any other terms. But Araujo minimised the improvement in conditions and described his ill-treatment as continuing “up to the present day" which scarcely accords with his statement above or with Barros’s report that the bendahara was doing Araujo “a thousand kindnesses” every day.

When Albuquerque reach Malacca with his fleet in July 1511, the bendahara had been executed by Mahmud, but Araujo depicted the sultan to Albuquerque in the same damaging light as the dead minister. If Mahmud had not been an accomplice to the plot against Sequeira and was anxious to restore friendly relations with the Portuguese, his chances of convincing Albuquerque of his sincerity were ruined by Araujo. On the other hand, if Mahmud was lying in order to complete his preparations for war, Araujo performed a notable service in unmasking the deception and urging Albuquerque to attack regardless of the fate of the prisoners. Both interpretations are tenable.

The preliminary exchanges between sultan Mahmud and Albuquerque quickly resolved themselves into a single issue. Were the Portuguese prisoners to be released and compensation paid for the Sequeira incident before or after the signing of peace? Albuquerque insisted on prior release and compensation, while Mahmud demanded that a peace treaty should be signed first. It might be argued that Mahmud’s reluctance to release Araujo

18. For a pro-Albuquerque version of this incident, see the Commentaries, III, pp. 48 — 54, written by Albuquerque’s son. Albuquerque argued that Diogo Mendes could achieve no more alone than Sequeira had done and that the Egyptian menace to Aden must have priority. On the other hand, Albuquerque had consistently evaded his pledge to reinforce Diogo Mendes’s fleet and in this respect Mendes’s irritation was excusable.
19. Albuquerque used Araujo’s letter in his attempt to persuade Diogo Mendes to release his ships for the Red Sea expedition.
20. An Indian copper coin.
22. Loc.cit.
23. Macgregor Papers.
and the other survivors was a sign of bad faith, but this was not necessarily the case. Albuquerque could easily abrogate any peace treaty he signed if Mahmud then failed to release the prisoners; but Mahmud could not recover the prisoners if Albuquerque declined to make peace after their release. In fact, Araujo’s spirit of self-sacrifice in urging Albuquerque to attack at the cost of his own life rendered the Portuguese prisoners valueless as a bargaining counter, but Mahmud was not aware of this fact. Similarly, the feverish efforts of Mahmud and the Moslem merchants to construct stockades and gun emplacements, to which Araujo referred, are not an unquestionable proof of Mahmud’s duplicity. Mahmud would have been a very foolish man had he not foreseen the possible failure of the negotiations and taken steps for the defence of Malacca.

Whether Mahmud’s overtures were inspired by a genuine regret for the events of 1509 or by a fear of Albuquerque’s armada, he was certainly not anxious to begin hostilities. In the Commentaries, Albuquerque’s son denounces several sorties by Malay lancharas from Malacca river as aggressive and provocative: “with these trickeries and follies they thought to get the advantage of Afonso Dalboquerque”. But it is difficult to see how an advantage could be gained by lancharas which refrained from attacking the Portuguese ships; rather the sorties were designed as displays of Malay might to dissuade the Portuguese from beginning hostilities. It was Albuquerque, convinced by Araujo of Mahmud’s duplicity, who first sent boats to bombard the city, and it was he who burned the Cambay ships and the houses along the waterfront. Mahmud immediately released Araujo and the other Portuguese survivors, discarding the peace treaty as a sine qua non. Instead, he asked Albuquerque to lay down the conditions on which he would agree to a peaceful settlement. These included a claim for monetary compensation for the losses incurred by Sequeira and the cession of a site for a Portuguese fortress in Malacca to ensure that the 1509 incident would not be repeated. If Mahmud had ever entertained the hope that he might negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese while retaining his sovereignty unimpaired, the second demand must have shattered his illusions. The strategic and commercial value of Malacca was too apparent for Albuquerque to be satisfied with anything less than a fort, although the subsequent reluctance of his captains to build A Famosa suggests that they would have been satisfied with a little vengeful plundering. According to the Portuguese accounts, Mahmud accepted Albuquerque’s conditions initially, much to Albuquerque’s surprise, but then suspended serious negotiations for several days. Albuquerque was reassured of the sultan’s duplicity and made preparations for the attack.

The key objective of the Portuguese was the bridge over the Malacca river, connecting the “royal quarter” on the south side with the

24. If the Malacan government relaxed its severe treatment of Araujo and his compatriots about the end of 1510 because it feared a Portuguese punitive expedition, it is strange that little was done to build defence works until July 1511. Possibly, the internal political situation was disturbed by the execution of the bendahara.
25. In one of the contradictory reports ascribed to Araujo, it is stated that the sultan scoffed at the numerical weakness of Albuquerque’s armada.
29. The royal palace and mosque were on the south side of the bridge and it was from that direction that Mahmud led his counterattack.
merchant communities living in the northern districts. A preliminary reconnaissance raid had revealed to Albuquerque that the bulk of the population lived north of the river, and Araujo recommended the capture of the bridge to divide the enemy forces. This plan was adopted and the first landing was made at dawn on St. James’s Day, 24 July, 1511. The main body of the Portuguese infantry, led by Albuquerque, landed on the northern side of the bridge; a smaller force, under Joao da Lima and several other fidalgos, landed south of the bridge near the mosque and palace. After heavy fighting, the stockades defending the approaches to the bridge were captured by the respective detachments, which then turned to meet Malay counterattacks from both sides of the town. South of the bridge, Joao da Lima had to face the elephants of the sultan, carrying archers, and led by Mahmud himself. The elephants were forced into retreat when Mahmud's elephant was wounded and turned on its fellows; Mahmud was wounded in the hand and fell back to the palace on St. Paul's Hill to regroup his men; but several hundred Malays broke through Joao da Lima's lines to attack Albuquerque’s force on the north side of the bridge from the rear. Albuquerque’s men had to fight back to back for some time until Joao da Lima's force, relieved of pressure from Mahmud, crossed the bridge and destroyed the Malays.

The presence of Mahmud and his relatively intact force on St. Paul’s Hill prevented Albuquerque and Da Lima from advancing far up the main street into the northern part of the town. The most they could do was to drive their opponents into the side streets and mount cannons on the north side of the bridge to sweep the main street. Sorties by Mahmud’s men prevented Albuquerque from completing his stockades on the south side of the bridge. By mid-day, Albuquerque’s men were exhausted and hungry, but he could not spare the men to bring in food supplies by boat. He decided to withdraw to his ships and embarked at sunset with 72 bombards taken from the Malay stockades. The Portuguese set fire to the neighbouring houses, the palace and the mosque before they withdrew. Their casualties were seventy wounded, those hit by the poisoned darts of the Malays dying except for Fernao Gomes.

During the seventeen days between the first and second Portuguese attacks, the Chinese seacaptains who had assisted Albuquerque to land his men on 24 July sailed for home. Utimutaraja, the leading Javanese merchant in Malacca, who held the allegiance of at least six thousand Javanese, placed himself under Albuquerque’s protection, although he continued to go through the motions of supporting Mahmud. Naina Chettu, the leading Hindu merchant, who had proved himself a good friend of Araujo during his captivity, kept Albuquerque informed of Mahmud’s efforts to improve the defences. On the Portuguese side, the preparations for the second landing were much more thorough. Entrenching equipment and earthpacked barrels for stockades were put in readiness, and a heavy, well-protected junk was moved on the spring tides towards the bridge so that it might provide the Portuguese with a vantage point for the attack. The attempts of the Malays to set fire to the junk were revealed to Albuquerque before hand by Naina Chettu and were foiled; not even the shattering of the jaw of the junk's commander, Antonio d’Abreu,30 by a musket shot, 30. D’Abreu refused to surrender his command despite his wound. He served at Malacca after its capture and was one of the first Portuguese to attempt the Brunei route from Ternate to Malacca. He was killed when his ship was destroyed in a Malay raid on Malacca in 1523.